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Federated authentication and authorisation infrastructure enables Single Sign On with
the user’s home organisation account to services provided by other organisations. Finnish
universities, polytechnics and CSC – IT Center for Science have established the Haka
federation, which is used for user authentication in many WWW services offered for stu-
dents and faculty. The availability and reliability of authentication and authorisation
infrastructure is critical to the services that rely on it.
This thesis introduces the problem of monitoring an authentication and authorisation in-
frastructure. A monitoring application called AAIEye is introduced. The application is
used for monitoring availability and usage statistics of the authentication and authorisa-
tion infrastructure. It is available as open source and can be used for monitoring other
federations that use the same kind of technology as Haka, i.e. SAML 2.0 or Shibboleth.
The distributed nature of a federation makes it demanding to operate it and diagnosing
problems can be difficult between different organisations. Monitoring the service avail-
ability is hard, because monitoring a single component does not say much about the
availability of the federation. In this thesis, an end user approach is used to address this
problem, and availability monitoring is implemented by simulating a WWW browser.
Another challenge for a federation is collecting the usage statistics. The services of the
federation create logs, but getting the whole picture of how much the services are used
would help when planning new services or federation operator’s work. For this purpose, a
service for collecting and presenting the usage statistics of a federation is introduced.
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Luottamusverkosto mahdollistaa ka¨ytta¨jille kertakirjautumisen toisen organisaation pal-
veluihin oman organisaationsa ka¨ytta¨ja¨tunnuksella. Suomen korkeakoulut yhdessa¨ tie-
teen tietotekniikan keskus CSC:n kanssa muodostavat Haka-luottamusverkoston, jota
ka¨yteta¨a¨n laajalti opiskelijoille ja henkilo¨kunnalle tarjottavissa WWW-pohjaisissa pal-
veluissa ka¨ytta¨jien autentikointiin. Luottamusverkoston luotettava toiminta ja saatavuus
ovat olennaisia siita¨ riippuville palveluille.
Ta¨ssa¨ tyo¨ssa¨ tutustutaan luottamusverkoston valvonnan erityispiirteisiin ja haasteisiin.
Tyo¨ssa¨ esitella¨a¨n valvontaa varten kehitetty AAIEye-ohjelmisto, jota ka¨yteta¨a¨n Haka-
luottamusverkoston valvontaan ja ka¨ytto¨tilastointiin. Ohjelmisto on julkaistu avoimen
la¨hdekoodin periaatteella ja sovellettavissa myo¨s muiden SAML 2.0 tai Shibboleth -
tekniikkaa ka¨ytetta¨vien luottamusverkostojen valvontaan.
Luottamusverkoston hajautettu rakenne tuo sen ylla¨pitoon haasteensa, ja vikaselvittely
monen organisaation va¨lisissa¨ palveluissa voi olla tyo¨la¨sta¨. Myo¨s palveluiden saatavuuden
valvonta on vaikeaa, koska yhden komponentin valvonta ei viela¨ kerro koko luottamusver-
koston toiminnasta. Ta¨ma¨n vuoksi tyo¨ssa¨ kehitetyssa¨ ratkaisussa palveluiden saatavuuden
valvonta on toteutettu loppuka¨ytta¨ja¨n na¨ko¨kulmasta WWW-selainta simuloimalla.
Hajautetussa palvelussa haasteena on myo¨s ka¨ytto¨tilastojen kera¨a¨minen. Luottamusver-
koston palvelut muodostavat kukin oman lokinsa, mutta ka¨yto¨n kokonaiskuvan saaminen
auttaa luottamusverkoston operoinnin ja uusien palveluiden suunnittelussa. Tyo¨ssa¨ esi-
tella¨a¨n ratkaisu ka¨ytto¨tilastojen keskitetysta¨ tallennus- ja esityspalvelusta.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Wide range of applications today share a common need for authentication – that is,
determining whether someone or something is, in fact, who or what it is declared to
be. Closely related to the problem of authentication is authorisation – determining
whether someone or something has a permission to do something. For example, an
ATM requires that the user authenticates herself using her credit card and a PIN
code – a successful authentication authorises her to withdraw money from her bank
account. The problem is common for many different applications within organisation
and also inter-organisationally – the organisation barriers have to be crossed today
in many ways.
Inter-organisational authentication and authorisation has been a problem of many
applications which have to identify their users reliably. There is a need for secure
user authentication and an up-to-date database of users personal data, which can
be used in authorisation decisions. These tasks are common for a wide range of
applications. Currently, the authentication is commonly done with a separate user-
name and password to each service accessed. The users have several usernames and
passwords to remember, and this causes more administrative work on user man-
agement and possibly weakened security as the password quality tends to decrease
when there are many separate passwords needed. Authorisation is also problematic
as the up-to-date user data has to be stored in every service, but many applications
have little means to make sure that this data is updated.
An Authentication and Authorisation Infrastructure(AAI) offers a solution to many
1
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of these requirements. The idea is to provide a single digital identity and to store the
identity data about the user in one location – which is then handled by an Identity
Provider (IdP). Identity Provider is responsible for authenticating the users and
providing the identity data, which can be queried by the services. The services
must then rely on the information provided by the Identity Provider, meaning that
there must be trust between the services offering authentication and the services
using that information. This trust network is called a federation.
This thesis concentrates on AAI solutions for web applications. We will introduce the
Security Assertions Markup Language (SAML) which has become a popular solution
in building AAI between organisations. We will also have a look on Shibboleth
software developed by Internet2 as an implementation of SAML protocol and see
how it is used.
In higher education there are many applications that can benefit from AAI, library
and e-learning systems like Moodle as an example. In 2002, CSC – IT Center for
Science and several Finnish universities started a project to support the development
of user management processes. This project, Haka, resulted in establishing a Finnish
higher education federation which also got the name Haka. The technical solution for
Haka federation was Shibboleth. Haka has been in production use in Finnish higher
education since August 2005. It is currently used in most of the Finnish universities
and in many polytechnics, and in various service providers such as library portals,
including service providers outside Finnish borders. Shibboleth is being used in
several other countries as well, like France, Switzerland and the United States.
Some work is also being done to enable co-operation of the national federations.
The Ge´ant2/Joint Research Activity 5 (GN2/JRA5) project tries to establish an
European confederation using eduGAIN AAI, a software currently being developed
across the Europe aiming to enable interoperability between different AAIs. Other
work in this are is Kalmar Union which started in September 2009. Kalmar Union
connects educational federations of the Nordic countries, including Finland, Sweden,
Norway, Denmark and Iceland.
As the federations are gaining more members and more critical services, their oper-
ationality becomes more important, and to measure this some statistics are needed.
This means that the need for service monitoring and usage statistics is growing.
There are wide range of monitoring systems suitable for network and service moni-
toring, but it turns out that the existing solutions do not fit well for the needs of AAI
monitoring. The distributed nature of AAI adds complexity, since the AAI crosses
organisational borders and there is no centralised entity in charge. The distributed
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management, the handling of sensitive personal information and the complex and
varied deployment environment makes it challenging to maintain the federation, and
it also makes it challenging to build a monitoring and a reporting system for them.
To overcome these, this thesis describes the design and implementation of a moni-
toring and reporting system suitable for web-based authentication and authorisation
infrastructures.
1.2 Problem Statement
The objectives of this thesis are to design and implement a monitoring and reporting
system for federations. The main functional requirements are that the solution:
• Can monitor the availability of the federation providers. This means, that the
system must be able to determinate whether the components are working and
configured correctly - so the users can actually access the resources.
• Can produce usage statistics, that can be used in monitoring and developing
the federation. This includes the number of login events in the federations
services.
• Does not compromise the security of the federation.
• Does not compromise the privacy of the end users.
• Does not notably affect the performance of the federation.
These requirements are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
1.3 Evaluation Criteria
The main purpose of the work is to produce a practical and useful solution for
monitoring and reporting in AAI. One way to measure successfulness is how the
requirements are met.
The other way of measurement is to look how quickly and comprehensively the
solution is deployed. Due to nature of distributed environment and organisations
there are however lots of other dependencies slowing down the deployment. These
are not purely technical or can be affected by this work – the workload of the system
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administrators, their technical competence, data security policies in universities are
examples of factors that will have effect on the speed of deployment.
The monitoring and reporting system will collect status data on how the federation
works. This data can be used in defining an evaluation criteria - the number of
false alarms versus real cases, the required maintenance work, the detection and
problem solving time in failure cases can be used when estimating the success of
this work. However, as there is no historical data, the real value of the work can
not be calculated just by numbers.
1.4 Scope
The architecture is designed to fit for the monitoring and reporting needs of Haka
federation, and tries to make it possible to use it even in upcoming eduGAIN con-
federation.
The implementation is focused on the Shibboleth software and protocol, and in
particular its usage in Finnish higher education federation Haka.
1.5 Structure
This thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 describes the main concepts of AAI and architecture of Shibboleth and
eduGAIN authentication and authorisation infrastructures.
Chapter 4 explains the requirements of monitoring and reporting that were defined
in the beginning of this work, and introduces some existing applications that are used
for network systems monitoring and reporting and how they meet the requirements.
In Chapter 5, the architecture, design and implementation choices of the work is
described.
The results of the work are then summarised in Chapter 6.
Chapter 2
Authentication and
Authorisation
This chapter introduces Authentication and Authorisation Infrastructure, its main
ideas, protocols and components and how they work together. The protocols and
their interoperability is discussed and two examples of identity federations – Haka
federation and eduroam – are introduced.
2.1 Authentication
There is a need to distinguish users in many applications to provide personalised
service for the users, for example when using e-mail. A computer system needs to
find out who the user is and link the user to her personal data. E-mail address
and social security number are examples of identity attributes, which form the users
digital identity.
Authentication is a procedure where user’s identity is verified. There are numerous
different authentication mechanisms, which can be categorised in several ways. The
authentication mechanism can depend on
• Something that the user knows (username and password, for example).
• Something that the user has (an ID card, private key).
• Something that the user is (biometrics [10]).
5
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or some combination of these. For example, an ATM requires a valid card (which
the user has) and a correct password (which the user should know).
A problem when authenticating users is confidence in authentication strength. By
relying on username and password there is always a possibility that they are used
by someone else than the person they belong to. Relying on something that the
user has, like car keys, has similar weakness. On the other hand, using more secure
authentication methods may be too expensive considering the risks. With authen-
tication strength we can sort authentication mechanism based on the confidence we
have on them.
The strength of authentication and level of assurance depends on the authentication
mechanism, but a strong authentication mechanism is not sufficient alone. The
identity of the user must be ensured properly when opening a user account, and
every time when the identity data is altered. Changing a password is one example
– the request for password change must also be authenticated properly.
2.2 Authorisation
An authorisation decision is done after authentication. Positive access control deci-
sion means that the authenticated user has access to the service. There are several
ways to do authorisation decisions, depending on their authorisation policy. One
simple way is that all authenticated users are also authorised, but things can go far
beyond that. An authorisation decision can be based, for example, on:
• The roles that the identity has (A professor has an access to student’s grading
system, while a student has not).
• Time; the authorisation may be dependent on some time interval (the doors
of the campus are open only daytime).
• The strength of the authentication.
• Delegation; rights may be delegated to other user.
• The requested data or service.
• A (physical) location; an IP address range (Intranet is only accessible inside
the company’s own network).
• Access control list or attributes of the requested data or service.
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2.3 Authentication and Authorisation Infrastructure
The idea behind Authentication and Authorisation Infrastructure (AAI) is to offer
authentication and authorisation as a service which applications may rely on. Mid-
dleware software (see Figure 2.1) is defined “as a layer of software whose purpose
is to mask heterogeneity and to provide a convenient programming model to ap-
plication programmers” [14]. AAI software can be categorised as middleware as it
removes the need for every application to define its own mechanism for authentica-
tion and authorisation. An Authentication Service is a service which authenticates
the user and produces authentication statements.
Figure 2.1: Software and hardware layers in distributed systems [14]
An Identity Provider guards the identity information of its users. Identity Provider
offers authentication service, and it may offer attribute service, releasing the identity
attributes to the Service Providers that are requesting the information.
A Service Provider protects the service that requires authentication. It’s role is to
request authentication from the Identity Provider, if the user has no valid session.
The Service Provider consumes Authentication and Attribute assertions, and it may
make authorisation decision based on them or let the application handle it.
2.4 Federated Identity
Traditionally, a user has multiple identities – an information about the user is stored
in every service she is using. For example, in academic world, user’s e-mail, name
and student id number are common examples of personal information which can be
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stored in dozens of services she is using. For every service, she has to register and
supply the information needed, if the services are not connected to some centralised
directory. Since the services can be offered by various organisations and companies,
this is not often possible. The services need usually some kind of authentication,
so the user has to login every time she wants to access the service, and for security
reasons, several passwords are required.
Another problem comes from the service providers point of view. Every service has
to handle and store information about the user and that data must be up-to-date,
which is practically impossible to guarantee, when the only source of information
relies on users activity.
Federated identity simplifies both end users and service providers task. A single
identity is created and hosted in the users home organisation, and that identity is
used throughout the federation.
User directory / IdM
Protected resource
Identity Provider
User Request 
protected 
resource
Authentication
User Attributes
Authentication &
Attribute 
Assertions
User’s Home Organisation
Other organisation
Figure 2.2: Federated Identity
A federation is a trust network – federation’s member trust each other on identity
management. This poses high requirements for home organisation’s identity man-
agement, since all the Service Providers will trust the information that they share.
If there is only one place where user’s attributes are stored, it is enough to keep
that source updated. For example, when a user’s address changes, it is enough to
inform the home organisation about the new address, not all of the services where
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the user has an account. In practice, most services will still need some data that is
related to the specific service and the specific user. Using federated identity means
that the question of where the data should be stored needs to be answered when
designing a new service. A service may get all of its user identity data from the
identity provider, it may store some data locally or it may only use the identity
provider for authentication.
Federated identity has some benefits for the end user also, apart from reducing the
work for updating her identity information in different places. It enables a single
authentication mechanism to be used for every service in federation – a single pass-
word, biometrics, etc. – whatever authentication mechanism that is implemented
in her home organisation’s identity provider. Using this identity provider, a sin-
gle sing-on solution may be offered even between different organisations and their
services. The service providers can benefit by saving human work, as the need for
credential provisioning and helpdesk work for recovering lost passwords is reduced,
when the identity is stored in a single place.
The number and quality of passwords is one of the biggest risks in traditional ser-
vices. The users may use passwords that are easy to guess, and the same password
can be used in many services. Federated identity management changes the situation
– the risks are even bigger, since one password is enough to access whole federation’s
services. But since the number of passwords is reduced, stronger passwords can be
forced to use. Stronger authentication mechanisms can replace the passwords, and
only the home organisations have to implement them – not every service. It is not
needed to store sensitive passwords and personal information on every service, which
will reduce the risk of identity theft in case of services get compromised.
2.4.1 Attributes
One main benefit of federated identity management is possibility to store user infor-
mation only in her own home organisation, and this information can be queried from
the home organisation’s Identity Provider by Service Providers. The information
transferred is called attributes, which syntax and semantics must be agreed between
the service requesting the information and the Identity Provider. Typical examples
of attributes are e.g. an e-mail address or a person’s name, and some identifier
which uniquely identifies the person within a federation.
If the Service Provider and the Identity Provider are part of larger federation, the
attributes may be defined for the whole federation. This removes the need to agree
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on attributes between every Identity and Service Provider. In Haka federation for
example, funetEduPersonSchema [17] is a schema defining the syntax and semantics
of attributes exchanged within Haka federation. There are other schemas, like Schac
or eduPerson, which are used in other federations around the world.
2.4.2 Managing Trust
The idea of federated identity requires trust between participating parties. The
Service Provider must rely on Identity Provider to implement proper authentication
and to provide valid and up-to-date attributes about the end user. On the other
hand the Identity Provider must trust that the Service Provider handles the possibly
sensitive identity information in a proper way. Establishing trust is not a technical
question that AAI software can solve – it is a question that must be solved oﬄine.
The level of trust requirement varies, some federations may require very high level
of trust while some others can work with lower level trust. This depends on the
federations services and the trust requirements must be thought when adding a new
Service Provider to a new federation.
A federation is basically a trust network. The trust relationship is born by joining
a federation. Depending on the federation model, this relationship may be bilateral
between every federation member, or it may be transferred to some degree.
The end user needs a trust relationship too. She should be concerned on how her
digital identity is stored, transferred and used within a federation. In European
Union there are strong laws and directives helping to protect the privacy. For
a Service Provider this means that only those attributes that are necessary for
providing the service may be used. The user must also be informed what personal
information is transferred and how it is used and released to third parties.
2.4.3 Single Sign On and Single Logout
Single Sign On solutions are a way to simplify the login procedure. The user needs
to authenticate herself only once – this authentication information is then available
for other SSO aware applications too.
While it is possible to build a web-based SSO systems, the question of single logout
is perhaps harder. A logout button can be presented in the Service Provider after
the user has logged in, and it can log out the users session on that Service Provider.
But the session still exists in the user’s Identity Provider and in the other Service
CHAPTER 2. AUTHENTICATION AND AUTHORISATION 11
Providers she has used in this session. The difficulty comes from knowing all the
providers involved - and even if they can be known, the stateless nature of HTTP
makes it hard to build a reliable logout functionality. Using HTTP redirects, the
user’s browser could be sent to all the providers necessary, but what would happen
if some site does not respond? The redirect chain would be incomplete, leaving the
session valid in part of the providers.
Figure 2.3 represents a situation where user is accessing several applications. There
are multiple sessions – the Identity Provider has a session, each Service Provider
have a session, and the applications often have their own session handling too. A
traditional logout would end only the session with each application, but leave session
still valid with Service Provider and Identity Provider. A Single Logout, as specified
in SAML specification, would have to clear the session in each Service Provider the
user has accessed, and in the Identity Provider. A cooperation is then needed to
clear the sessions from accessed applications too.
Figure 2.3: Single Logout Problem
However, it is not clear what kind of functionality the user is expecting when she
clicks on the logout button. Traditionally, this would log her out of the applica-
tion where she requested logout without affecting other applications. The Single
Logout behaviour might be unpleasant for her – the applications may be completely
unrelated to each other and single logout can be unexpected and unwanted result.
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2.5 Security Assertions Markup Language (SAML)
The Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)[26][12] is a framework for ex-
changing security information between partners. It is based on XML, SOAP and
HTTP - authentication and authorisation information transferred in a common XML
format between applications. This authorisation information – attributes – makes
it possible to apply complex authorisation policies in service provider, possibly com-
bining attributes and deciding authorisation on the combined values.
<samlp:AuthnRequest
xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
AssertionConsumerServiceURL=
"https://aitta2.funet.fi/Shibboleth.sso/SAML2/POST"
Destination=
"https://aitta2.funet.fi:8443/idp/profile/SAML2/Redirect/SSO"
ID="_3f0bbf72ad491c03452c139b58c811a4"
IssueInstant="2010-01-18T05:35:02Z"
ProtocolBinding="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-POST"
Version="2.0">
<saml:Issuer
xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion">
https://aitta2.funet.fi/shibboleth
</saml:Issuer>
<samlp:NameIDPolicy AllowCreate="1"/>
<samlp:RequestedAuthnContext>
<saml:AuthnContextClassRef
xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion">
urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:PasswordProtectedTransport
</saml:AuthnContextClassRef>
</samlp:RequestedAuthnContext>
</samlp:AuthnRequest>
Listing 2.4: SAML Authentication Request
SAML assertions can be transferred using front-channel or back-channel. The
back-channel is a connection between Service Provider and Identity Provider us-
ing HTTP/SOAP protocol for transferring the assertions. The front-channel uses
no direct communication between Service Provider and Identity Provider, instead,
the user’s web browser using normal HTTP protocol with GET or POST method
is used.
To ensure the message integrity and confidentiality, SAML recommends using HTTP
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over SSL 3.0 or TLS 1.0, and authentication should be done for both server
and the client. XML signatures must be used when transferring assertions using
Browser/POST profile, which is described later in this section. XML Encryption
may be used to assure message-level security when SSL/TLS is not used or addi-
tional protection is wanted.
Today there exists numerous SAML implementations, both as commercial products
as well as open-source. Some examples are listed in Table 2.1, but the list is not
comprehensive.
Supported Protocol
Lasso ID-FF 1.2, ID-WSF, SAML 2.0
Microsoft ADFS WS-Federation
OAuth OAuth protocol
OpenID OpenID protocol
OpenSSO SAML 1.1, 2.0
Ping Identity SAML 2.0
simpleSAMLphp SAML 2.0
Shibboleth SAML 1.1, 2.0
ZXID SAML 2.0
Table 2.1: Examples of AAI software
2.5.1 Liberty Alliance and WS-* Protocols
The Liberty Alliance is a consortium formed in 2001 for developing common speci-
fications for federated identity management. They have developed the Liberty Fed-
eration, including ID-FF 1.1, ID-FF 1.2 and SAML 2.0 specifications. To help the
interoperability between different products and vendors, Liberty Alliance organises
SAML 2.0 interoperability testing.
Microsoft and IBM have developed their own specifications for federated identity,
including WS-Security, WS-Federation, WS-Trust and WS-Policy and several other
specifications. These specifications describe different security tokens, infrastructures
and trust topologies. Though WS-* can be configured to accept SAML tokens, the
interoperability is limited. However, Microsoft’s ADFS 2.0 (Geneva) services, which
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are currently at beta stage, do support SAML 2.0.
2.5.2 SAML protocol versions 1.1 and 2.0
The SAML protocol specification converged from Liberty Alliance’s work and OASIS
SAML 1.1 version to SAML version 2.0. This version brings in major changes, and
it is incompatible with previous versions. Main new features are support for W3C
XML Encryption for encrypting SAML assertions, merging the Browser/Artifact
and Browser/POST into a single Web Browser Single Sign-On (SSO) Profile and a
new Identity Provider Discovery Profile.
Though SAML 2.0 is not compatible with previous versions, the main benefit is
better compatibility between SAML 2.0 implementations. The full protocol speci-
fication is however large and complex, and most implementations implement only
a small subset of it. This in turn may cause incompatibility, which is handled by
defining SAML deployment profiles and running interoperability tests. The Liberty
Alliance project does this kind of interoperability testing, and one example of defin-
ing SAML deployment profile is saml2int[32] – a simple, but useful SAML profile
for Web SSO that defines the mandatory features of SAML that must be imple-
mented to be saml2int compatible. Figure 2.5 shows relationships between Oasis
standards, Microsoft WS-* and Liberty Alliance.
WS-Federation
WS-PolicyWS-Trust
WS-Security SAML 1.0
SAML 1.1
WSS
SAML 2.0
IDEF 1.0
IDEF 1.1
WSF 1.2IDEF 1.2
Liberty Phase 3
Microsoft / 
IBM
Oasis Liberty Alliance
Dependency
Relation
Figure 2.5: The interrelationship among federation standards [30]
2.5.3 Profiles
A SAML profile is an exact description how a supported use case of SAML is im-
plemented, the most important use case for this thesis being Web Browser Single
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Sign-On (SSO).
SAML 1.1 defines two profiles. Browser/POST profile, like its name suggests, relies
on HTTP POST method as a way to transfer assertions to the Service Provider.
Once the user has authenticated herself, a HTML POST form is presented. This
form contains the assertion, which is then (perhaps automatically using Javascript)
sent to the Service Provider. The SAML response containing the assertion must be
digitally signed using XML digital signature which is described later in this chapter.
Browser/Artifact is another profile; it uses pull model for assertions instead of push.
The user has an artifact, which is an identifier containing information about the
source site and a reference to the assertion. Using this reference, the Service Provider
can request the assertion from Identity Provider using back-channel. The back-
channel is implemented by HTTP/SOAP connection between the Service Provider
and Identity Provider.
In SAML 2.0, these two profiles have been merged into single Web SSO profile.
2.5.4 XML Digital Signatures
The SAML assertions can be transferred in unencrypted format which would make
them vulnerable for alternation attacks. For example, using Browser/POST pro-
file means that SAML assertions are transferred via users web browser, making it
possible to alter the content for the user. It is also possible to use HTTP as a
transfer protocol instead of HTTPS, where assertions are transferred unencrypted
all the way. To deal with these risks XML digital signatures[19] are mandatory
in SAML assertions when using unencrypted transfer methods. XML signature is
W3C Recommendation, and it can be used to guarantee the integrity of any XML
document.
2.5.5 SAML Metadata
In SAML the trust is largely based on SAML metadata [11]. SAMLmetadata defines
the providers that are trusted and their technical contact details, like addresses and
protocols and profiles that are supported. The Identity Provider needs to have valid
SAML metadata about the Service Provider in order to provide authentication and
attribute statements to Service Provider. Vice versa, the Service Provider needs the
metadata about the Identity Provider, otherwise it can not trust received assertions.
The metadata is provided in XML file, which can be distributed bilaterally, or if
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provider is part of a federation, a federation may distribute a common metadata.
A federation metadata includes the metadata of all participants of the federation
- the Identity Providers and Service Providers. Its integrity and availability are
important, since all providers will trust its contents.
Federation metadata needs to be updated when federations participants change
their deployment, new Providers are added to the federation or existing providers
are removed. When all trust is build on the metadata, removing a compromised
service from federation requires a metadata update. Thus the Providers need to
update that file regularly.
2.5.6 Identity Provider Discovery
When a Service Provider decides that the user who is accessing its resources must
authenticate herself, it should redirect the user to her Identity Provider’s authen-
tication service. The problem is that if there are multiple Identity Providers, in
general the Service Provider has no knowledge of the user and what her Identity
Provider might be. In some cases it is possible to send all users to the very same
IdP, if that is the only one whose users are authorisated to access, but if there are
several Identity Providers providing access, this is not possible.
Instead of redirecting the user to the IdP, it is possible to use a Discovery Service
(DS) [29] or Where Are You From (WAYF) service and redirect the user to it. A
DS/WAYF service is an independent component that decides the user’s Identity
Provider with or without user interaction. A typical DS/WAYF service displays a
list of Identity Providers and asks for the user to select which one she wants to use.
This selection can be remembered or pre-selected by guessing based on the end users
IP address for example.
It is also possible to integrate the Identity Provider selection functionality directly
into the Service Provider. The Service Provider then has a user interface for se-
lecting the Identity Provider where it will redirect the user. This removes a single
point of failure, which centralised WAYF service introduces, and simplifies the user
experience, since the service can only provide links to those IdP’s whose users can
actually access the resource. On the other hand, it requires some programming logic
on the Service Provider instead of simply redirecting users to an external service.
Identity Provider discovery is a simple question technically. Instead, it has signifi-
cant usability problems. The federation may have hundreds or thousands Identity
Providers, and it is hard task to find the correct one. When existing federations are
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combined as a confederation this will make Identity Provider selection even harder.
The end user may not even know what Identity Provider to use – some users have
account on several Identity Providers, and authorisation may be possible only when
using some of them. The user must also use the Identity Provider consistently –
otherwise, using different Identity Provider may result in using different identity,
since those two accounts may not be linked within a service.
2.6 Shibboleth
Name Shibboleth is used here in two meanings - it is the name of the software [21]
developed by Internet2, and it is the name of the protocol that the software uses.
In this section, an overview of both Shibboleth software and protocol is given.
Shibboleth 1.x as a protocol is an extension to OASIS SAML 1.1 profile. Most
importantly, it adds the Service Provider first -approach as the SAML 1.1 specifies
only Identity Provider first -approach which is simpler. In the IdP first -scenario, the
login sequence starts when user authenticates herself on the IdP, which then redirects
the user to the service. In a federation with only one IdP this approach can work
pretty well. The SP first -approach makes it possible to begin the login sequence
by accessing a protected resource, and then be redirected to the Identity Provider
for authentication as the Service Provider sends an authentication request to the
IdP. This scenario requires that the IdP discovery problem is somehow addressed;
for example by using a WAYF service described earlier. The downside of using
Shibboleth 1.x as a protocol is incompatibility with other implementations, since
the SP first -approach and some other differences are not part of SAML 1.1.
Shibboleth versions 2.0 and above support SAML 2.0 protocol as well as previous
Shibboleth protocol. The default settings support quite well saml2int profile men-
tioned earlier. A major change when moving to Shibboleth 2.0 is that attribute
queries are left out by default, encouraging that the attributes are transferred via
user’s web browser. This change makes deployment of Shibboleth easier, as there is
no need to configure back-channel support.
Both versions of Shibboleth use a subset of SAML metadata. The trust management
can be done in two ways. The currently recommended way is to define Service and
Identity Provider credentials directly in the SAML metadata, either by using X.509
certificates or plain RSA/DSA public keys in the metadata. The other option is to
use PKI approach, and define a Certificate Authority (CA) certificate. The Identity
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and Service Provider certificates are then validated against this common CA.
User Service Provider Identity Provider
1. Access protected resource
Authentication Request
3. Authentication Assertion
6. Access protected resource
4. Attribute Request
5. Attribute Assertion
7. Requested content / Error message
2. Authentication Request
Authentication Assertion
Figure 2.6: Shibboleth Login
Figure 2.6 shows the login procedure using Shibboleth with Browser/POST profile.
1. User requests some resource that is protected by Shibboleth.
2. Service Provider requests an authentication. It checks if the user has a handle
describing her session - if not, a Authentication Request is issued. The user
may need to use a separate WAYF service to proceed to her Identity Provider.
3. After authenticating herself in her Identity Provider, the Identity Provider
assigns a handle describing this session. The handle is implemented as a
cookie or it may be attached to the URLs used.
4. The Service Provider will then ask for attributes from the Identity Provider
the user has used to authenticate herself. This is done by Attribute Request,
which contains the handle of the user.
5. The Identity Provider releases requested attributes about the user to the Ser-
vice Provider.
6. If using Browser/POST profile, the attributes are transmitted to the Service
Provider using a HTML form.
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7. Based on the attributes, the Service Provider does an authorisation decision
and returns the requested resource, or an error message.
2.6.1 Identity Provider
An Shibboleth Identity Provider is responsible for user’s attributes. A Authenti-
cation Authority component issues authentication statements to other Shibboleth
components.
When a user is accessing a resource and gets redirected to the Identity Provider,
first component that is connected is Single Sign-On service (SSO). A Single Sign-On
component is a Shibboleth specific - SAML 1.1 does not define it. SSO component
enables Service Provider first -approach, while SAML 1.1 supports only Identity
Provider first -solution.
Figure 2.7: Generating Attributes
Artifact Resolution Service is needed if Browser/Artifact -profile is used. It will
listen to Service Providers, which will send artifacts to Artifact Resolution Service
in order to get authentication assertion.
Attribute Authority answers to attribute requests send by Service Provider’s At-
tribute Requester component. The attribute requests and assertions are transmitted
using back channel without web browser.
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2.6.2 Service Provider
Shibboleth Service Provider is responsible for protecting the resources hosted by
a HTTP server. It is implemented as a module for HTTP server, like Apache
or Microsoft IIS, so it is limited to WWW applications. The authorisation decision
can be done by requiring specific attributes and specific attribute values. Shibboleth
Service Provider’s main components are Assertion Consumer Service and Attribute
Requester.
Assertion Consumer Service handles the authentication assertion. If attributes are
needed, Assertion Consumer Service will initiate an attribute request using Attribute
Requester component. If all goes well, the Assertion Consumer Service will finally
redirect the user to the requested resource.
Attribute Requester is responsible for sending attribute requests to the selected
Identity Provider.
2.7 Haka federation
The Haka federation [22] is a identity federation for higher education in Finland.
It was formed in May 2005 and it became operational in August 2005. Haka is
open for Finnish universities, polytechnics and research institutions to join as a
federation member. Federation member may bring its Identity Provider and Service
Provider(s) to Haka. Commercial companies may join Haka as partners if they are
providing services serving education or research. Haka federation partners may not
register Identity Provider to Haka, but only Service Providers. Joining Haka as
an Identity Provider requires that the organisations identity management passes
a self-audit, which requires some good practices are used when user accounts are
created, how they are updated and how identity management process works in the
organisation.
CSC – IT Center for Science acts as a Haka operator. Joining Haka means signing
a service agreement with CSC. In this hub-and-spoke federation model [30] a single
contract is enough, there is no need to sign contract with every member of Haka
– the trust and agreement is transferred via the federation operator. Federation
operators other main tasks include maintaining federation metadata, the Identity
Provider Discovery Service, test services and technical support for members and
partners.
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The end users of Haka are higher education students, teachers and faculty. At the
moment there are 39 Identity Providers and 78 Service Providers in Haka. Twelve
commercial companies have joined Haka as a partner, providing their services for
Haka community. Most heavily used services in Haka are library and learning man-
agement systems, e.g. Moodle systems.
Technically Haka started with SAML 1.1 protocol implemented by Shibboleth soft-
ware. When Shibboleth 2.0 release added support for SAML 2.0, Haka started the
migration process to SAML 2.0. This process is still ongoing and should be com-
pleted by the end of 2010, when all services must be SAML 2.0 compliant. The
main motivation for migrating the federation’s protocol is to enable interoperabil-
ity between various products, and first non-Shibboleth implementations using only
SAML 2.0 have been in use since the end of 2009.
For attributes Haka federation uses funetEduPerson [17] attribute schema which is
based on SCHema for ACademia (SCHAC) [9] and eduPerson schemas. The fu-
netEduPerson schema adds common attributes for Finnish higher education and
defines syntax and semantics for them. An example of such attribute is funet-
EduPersonStudyStart attribute, which describes the date when a student started
his/her studies. Technically, the schema defines the name of the attributes in three
format – a human readable format, an URN, which is used when using Shibboleth
1.x software, and OID format which is used with SAML 2.0. An example of this
attribute definition is in Table 2.2.
OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.16161.1.1.14
URN urn:mace:funet.fi:attribute-def:funetEduPersonStudyStart
Format: YYYYMMDD
Example: 20050826
Table 2.2: funetEduPersonStudyStart attribute definition
2.8 The eduroam
The eduroam [1] is a service for secure roaming network access for education net-
works around the world. It is based on RADIUS servers and IEEE 802.1X standard.
Authentication in eduroam is done by forwarding users login credentials to her home
organisation. For organisation to join eduroam, setting up a RADIUS server is re-
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quired. This server authenticates organisation’s eduroam users. Also the WLAN
hotspots must be configured to support eduroam requirements, for example they
must be IEEE 802.1X capable, and capable of forwarding credentials to the RA-
DIUS server. Technically, the eduroam RADIUS servers are used hierarchically (see
Figure 2.9). The top-level RADIUS server forwards the authentication requests
to national level server, which in turn knows the organisational level servers and
sends the authentication request there. The eduroam does only authentication, but
in [13] it is presented how authorisation can also be added to eduroam.
Figure 2.8: eduroam infrastructure [13]
Though eduroam uses different technology than SAML and is a bit out of scope of
this thesis, it is useful to have a closer look on it since the problems are similar.
Both eduroam and web-based AAI are distributed infrastructures and suffer from
same kind of difficulties in maintenance and diagnostics. The monitoring solution
for both infrastructures can well have similarities.
The eduroam is an example of confederation; national federations have joined to-
gether to form the eduroam confederation. This enables the end users of one feder-
ation to get network access even outside her own federation and country. There is
no accounting, so no money is directly involved. The reasoning is that “if you let
my users to use the network, I will let your users to do the same”, and in eduroam,
this works between organisations around the world. The idea of confederations is
discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
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Figure 2.9: eduroam RADIUS hierarchy [31]
Chapter 3
Beyond federations
This chapter takes a closer look on how existing federations can be joined to a single
confederation. The term “confederation” refers to “a federation of federations” and
that’s how federations can work together to offer their services for other federation’s
users too. The problems of confederations are discussed, and the Kalmar Union and
the eduGAIN confederations are introduced in this chapter.
3.1 Building interoperability between federations
As discussed in the previous chapter, federated identity has become a reality and sees
production use today. Many federations have been established around the world. In
the higher education field, federations are mostly within national borders, available
only to members from their home country. But there are potential use cases where
it is feasible to use federated identity even across these borders, like the example of
eduroam shows.
In the federated world there exists many different federations which are not com-
patible, either in technical means or by policy differences, or, most likely, both of
them. For example, in Finland there is a federation for higher education (Haka),
and in Norway there is operating Feide federation [4] for their universities, but if
Finnish students want to access Norwegian resources it is not possible, since the
user’s identity is in different federation than the service. Such scenarios may arise
also inside national borders – there might be several commercial federations, an
educational or state federations, so there is a need for interoperability between fed-
erations. Confederations, or interfederation, aims in making this kind of use cases
24
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possible.
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Figure 3.1: Confederation
3.1.1 Technical and practical challenges
There are however problems when building a confederation. From the technical point
of view, the variety of AAI systems is an issue - generally they are not compatible
with each other, each using different protocols. In the future the compatibility
is likely to increase, as many AAI’s are moving towards or already using SAML
2.0. Unfortunately SAML 2.0 can be implemented and used in many ways that
interoperability is not clear even when having a common protocol, as was discussed
earlier.
Federation bridges[20] may be implemented when the AAI software is not compat-
ible. The idea is to do protocol conversion at some bridge, which acts as gateway
between federations. A federation sees the bridge as an Identity Provider while the
other federation sees it as a Service Provider. Attributes can also be transformed in
the bridge. The bridging solution has some drawbacks however. It is a single point
of failure. It will break the confidentiality of the traffic, since it needs to be able to
decrypt the messages in order to do any transforming, so end-to-end confidentiality
is lost. And quite likely some functionality is lost when using bridging, since not all
features may be supported by both federations and by the bridge.
A common protocol and technology is not enough. A federation is basically a trust
network, and establishing trust is mostly non-technical issue. Different federations
typically have different requirements for joining the federation and different levels
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and requirements for security and privacy. For example, in Haka federation it is
required, that the end users identity is verified using an official document such
as passport. Not all federations have such requirement, and when this kind of
federations are interconnected this may become a problem for the services.
Not only the technical part has challenges, but the policies become important issue
when connecting different federations. For example, a term “student” can have quite
different interpretations between universities – even inside on country, but especially
between countries. To effectively use AAI’s as an authorisation mechanism, there
must be some sort of agreement on the syntax and semantics of transferred identity
data. A schema harmonisation work tries to find commonly agreeable interpretations
on the attributes. Also the privacy and data protection laws have to be considered
when building confederations.
Knowing Your Federation
The question of knowing user’s Identity Provider is harder with multiple federa-
tions. Like WAYF, a WFAYF (Which Federation Are You From) service could be
implemented to offer a way to determinate to which federation’s WAYF the user
is to be redirected. The idea is however as cumbersome as the acronym - perhaps
more intelligent solutions will appear as a Service Provider component or even as a
web browser add-ons.
3.2 eduGAIN
The eduGAIN [24] is an AAI that has been developed by Ge´ant 2’s JRA5 project
with interoperability of the federations as a main focus. It will bridge different AAI
implementations and thus allows connecting federations that are using different AAI
that are not directly compatible. eduGAIN is SAML 1.1 compatible, however, it
has been planned to move to SAML 2.0 as open source implementations stabilise –
this work is being done in Ge´ant 3 project.
The eduGAIN defines new components to enable interoperability. Bridging Element
(BE) is responsible for transferring eduGAIN assertions and queries to local feder-
ations format and vice versa, for example, there is an implementation for bridging
Shibboleth for federations using it. For a federation to join eduGAIN it is required
that it will install a bridging element which supports the software used within a
federation, if the federation’s software is not directly eduGAIN compatible.
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Metadata Service (MDS) answers metadata queries. It will contain the necessary
SAML metadata of the eduGAIN Service and Identity Providers. MDS is queried
by BE’s, and it acts as a common trusted source for eduGAIN metadata. The
Federation Peering Point (FPP) is responsible for publishing metadata to Metadata
Service. There is exactly one FPP per federation. The metadata is never signed
by MDS, its function is only to forward the metadata. Thus there are no high
requirements for trusting MDS, since the federations will sign their own metadata
by themselves.
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Figure 3.2: eduGAIN login procedure
Trust in eduGAIN is managed with public-key infrastructure (PKI). The eduGAIN
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has a common Certificate Authority (eduGAINCA), which is used to create
eduGAIN X.509 certificates. The XML signatures used in SAML assertions must
be validated against this certificate authority.
3.3 Kalmar Union
Kalmar Union [7], [28], [23] is a Nordic confederation which joins national higher ed-
ucation federations of Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Iceland. A contract
has been signed between national federation operators and Kalmar Union went into
production use in September 2009. For Service/Identity Provider to join Kalmar
Union it is required to join some national federation first.
The architecture of Kalmar Union is significantly simpler than eduGAIN. All partic-
ipating federations are using SAML 2.0 compatible protocol, so no protocol bridging
is required. There is still need agree on how exactly SAML 2.0 protocol is to be
used since the protocol offers multiple choices for implementation, implementing
and supporting all of them would be impractical for all confederation members.
The interoperability in Kalmar Union is based on saml2int profile[32] which de-
fines mandatory profiles. In addition, the attribute semantics differ slightly within
federations, so an agreement on common attributes was needed.
The Kalmar Union offers WFAYF server for selecting the home federation and then
a home Identity Provider. It also offers a metadata aggregate containing metadata
of all participating services. These are the only centralised services that are needed.
For a service already in some national federation, joining Kalmar Union is usually
straightforward, the Kalmar Union metadata must be used and service’s own meta-
data must be aggregated to confederation metadata. Since the Kalmar Union is a
federation of federations, it is needed that services are part of a national federation
first – joining straight to Kalmar Union is not possible for a single service.
3.4 Monitoring a Confederation
When there are challenges to set up and operate a single federation, working with
multiple federations is even more complex. Even when each federation is functioning
properly, there are components and settings that are needed for interfederation
support, like WFAYF service or metadata aggregate service that are used in Kalmar
Union, or the various bridging elements used in eduGAIN. A problem with one of
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them is enough to cause the system to fail. Many of those service are configured
dynamically, as new members are joining national federations or their configuration
is changed, and there is always a risk that something goes wrong when doing such
updates.
Testing login from different federations is one problem unique in confederation op-
erations. The login may work just fine from one federation, but not from the others.
The service administrator may have a user account on one Identity Provider, but
this does not help much; it would require multiple user accounts from different
federations to be reasonably sure that the service is accessible within whole confed-
eration, which is quite impractical. The number of required test cases also starts to
climb, and involves manual work from the administrators. So as the confederations
grow and are being used, the need for their availability and availability monitoring
is likely to rise.
Chapter 4
Requirements for AAI
Monitoring System
4.1 Motivation
The Haka federation steering committee expressed that getting usage statistics and
developing a monitoring system is important. CSC as Haka federation operator
started to study the problem. Since no off-the-self solution was found during the
preliminary study a software for monitoring was to be developed. CSC also partici-
pated in Geant2 project where JRA5 activity was focusing on AAI. As the problem
of monitoring and interest is common for all federations, part of the funding was pro-
vided within Geant2 project. This had an impact for the requirements specification
as the needs of eduGAIN had to be taken into account.
4.2 Requirements Specification
The work on monitoring and reporting system started with requirement specifica-
tion, where the requirements and constrains were identified and defined. These
include several functional requirements which define the functionality of the moni-
toring and reporting system, as well as non-functional requirements, which include
usability, stability and scalability for example.
The main functional requirement for the system is that it should be able to reliably
monitor the state of the AAI. Since the AAI is complex and distributed system,
monitoring just single components of it would not tell the whole truth – the compo-
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nents might be working just right, but the end user is still not experiencing what she
should. Several settings of the AAI are constantly changing and must be regularly
updated to keep the service running – the federation metadata and the attribute
release policies as an example. Monitoring all these settings individually would be
difficult or even impossible, so at the requirement phase it was clear that monitoring
must be done from the end user’s point of view. This approach would give the most
realistic results too.
Another important functional requirement was that the monitoring system must
be able to collect usage reports in Shibboleth-based AAI. There are no tools for
this provided within the Shibboleth software, so the administrators of Shibboleth
servers have a little idea on how much their services are used and who are the end
users. It is possible to collect this information from the log files that the Shibboleth
application generates, but there were no tools for this, so some automatised way
had to be developed. The usage report collecting system must also be designed in
a way that support for eduGAIN AAI can later be added.
It turned out that there would probably be different kinds of deployments of the
monitoring system. Not all organisations will create a test account, which is required
for the active monitoring, and not all of the organisations are willing to install and
maintain any kind of additional software - the probes - in their Identity or Service
provider host. These limitations mean, that the monitoring and reporting tool
should support various deployment strategies, and allow also partial use. At least
the monitoring and the reporting functions should be separate.
4.2.1 Interfaces
Many institutions using AAI are also doing some kind of network/service monitoring
already. For example, Nagios [8] is one popular tool for monitoring purposes. To
take advantage of this, the system developed should be integrateable to the existing
monitoring and reporting applications. As a demonstration of this, a plug-in for
Nagios is to be developed during the project. The existence of such applications
like Nagios means also that they can be used to perform many common tasks for
monitoring and reporting systems. An example would be e-mail notifications of the
problems - Nagios has a feature for this, so to take advantage of it, the monitoring
tool does not need to implement it. Other commonly needed feature is scheduled
service breaks – there has to be a way to temporarily disable the monitoring when
doing service maintenance work.
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Support for different AAI implementations is also useful. At least Shibboleth ver-
sions 1.3 and 2.0 and eduGAIN AAI’s should be supported for active monitoring.
Since there are many other AAI software in use, it has to be simple to add the
monitoring and reporting functions for other applications as well.
4.2.2 Performance
The performance requirements define that the system may not significantly affect
the performance of AAI. It is also required, that the parameters that can have
performance effects are customisable, to allow modifications depending on the needs
of local administrators. Allowing distributed configuration is not a requirement,
but an idea to consider in the future. The system administrators of the Identity
and Service Providers are the right persons to know how their services should be
monitored.
The active monitoring of AAI has some scalability issues if the tests are comprehen-
sive as they should be. To cover all connections, m x n tests are required, where m
means number of IdP’s in federation and n number of SP’s in federation. On the
other hand, it may not be necessary to test all connections very frequently, and prob-
ably not all IdP’s and SP’s will ever want to take part in monitoring - at least some
commercial service providers might not want to publish their availability statistics.
Still, scalability can be an issue when federations grow very large and comprehensive
monitoring is wanted. Deciding how often a connection is to be monitored affects
heavily on the load and performance of the monitoring.
4.3 Privacy and Security
Both Identity Providers and Service Providers may handle sensitive information,
like personal information about the end users - names, social security numbers etc.
Identity Providers store this information for all of their users, which usually means
hundreds or thousands users. Some Service Providers protect valuable resources -
super computers, personal databases, payment systems etc. This all imposes serious
requirements for the privacy and security of AAI system and components directly
involved with it, like the monitoring and reporting system developed here.
The active monitoring component is a potential security threat, since monitoring
requires a test user account and a password, which must be stored on the monitoring
host. These user accounts must be protected, since they will give an access to the
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protected resources that are monitored. Not all service providers are comfortable
with the idea of having such accounts that can be used to access their services. A
possible approach to this problem could be to define an attribute, which identifies the
user as a test user. The service provider could then decide how it wants to handle
these users - it could release enough information for determining that the login
procedure was successful, but denying access to any real resource. The downside
of this is that customisation is needed to the service’s software to handle these
restricted users.
Collecting the usage statistics is another problematic area. The log files of Identity
and Service Provider may contain lots of personal information about the users. But
since this personal data is not required for statistical reasons, a requirement can be
that the tool may not handle and store personal information.
4.4 Related Work
At the start of the work, information was gathered about similar monitoring and
reporting solutions and about possibly useful technologies for implementation. A few
AAI federations are using some kind of monitoring system, and at least within Swiss
higher education federation SWITCHaai there has been interest in usage statistics
as they have studied adding accounting to AAI [27].
Though it seemed that no easily adoptable solution can be found, the solutions and
tools found helped to collect the requirements and gave hint when selecting suitable
technologies for the implementation. There is some promising activity in this area,
like End-to-end Diagnostics System (EDDY) [3],[18] developed by Internet2, which
may offer similar functionalities in the near future. As more and more federations
evolve to production use, the need for monitoring and reporting solutions is likely
to rise and result in new applications in this area.
4.4.1 EDDY
EDDY project [3] aims on helping diagnosing problems that are hard and complex
due to their distributed nature. Many services are dependent from may lower-level
services and one of them misbehaving can cause errors that are difficult to diagnose.
EDDY tries to unify this diagnostic data by defining a common event format (CER)
and sharing diagnostic data between domains. A log from single application may
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not be enough to find out the real culprit of the problem. Combining logs of different
services to get the full picture may be helpful.
It was considered if the monitoring tool should support EDDY format. At the time
of the requirement specification and design, EDDY was in quite early stage but
seemed reasonably complex system. It was decided not to go this way, but if EDDY
becomes popular adding support for it might be considered.
4.4.2 eduroam monitoring
The eduroam infrastructure suffers from similar difficulties what comes to monitor-
ing. Eduroam architecture is equally distributed across organisations and countries,
making diagnostics hard. The monitoring solution discussed in [25] is pretty much
similar than the one described in this paper. The work for both projects has been
done under GEANT2/JRA5 project so the ideas could be shared and tested for
both monitoring purpose. The eduroam monitoring has been in production use
since August 2008 and is found from [2].
4.4.3 Nagios
Nagios is an open-source monitoring framework that can be used to monitor systems
in different levels. Often it is used to run simple tests, like probing the connection
to some host, or asking how much disk space is left on the server. This works by
using plug-ins, which are run by the Nagios process to report their status.
Nagios also offers a simple interface for application developers to write their own
plug-ins to satisfy their monitoring needs. This interface makes it possible to add
support for new monitoring targets, AAI monitoring as one example.
4.4.4 Summary
Although many approaches were reviewed for this monitoring purpose, none of them
seemed exactly match the requirements. This means that some new code had to
be written. A general monitoring application like Nagios or OpenNMS or their
commercial alternatives is probably used in most of the bigger organisations, so it
is important that the monitoring solution to developed would work together with
them rather than being a separated application. Since Nagios is being widely used
in organisations using Shibboleth at least within Haka, it was a requirement that
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the monitoring part has to be implemented as a Nagios plug-in. Support other
monitoring applications should be easy to implement later if needed.
Chapter 5
Design and Implementation
5.1 Design Goals
A design principle was to keep the functionality separated in different components,
to make it possible to change one component without much effort. This will make it
easier to add support for different AAI implementations and develop new function-
ality for the application. The application to be developed was named as AAIEye.
5.2 Architecture
Figure 5.1 shows the main components of the monitoring and reporting system, the
arrows showing the dependencies between components. The heart of the system is
monitoring server. Its responsibilities are:
• Perform the active monitoring test cases.
• Receive and store the usage statistics data.
• Respond to the queries about monitoring status.
The usage statistics and monitoring test results can be browsed with AAIEye Statis-
tics Viewer application. It is a PHP script that reads its input data from SQL
database, where it gets filled by AAIEye monitoring server.
To offer support for Nagios, a plug-in is implemented. The plug-in is a small Perl
application that Nagios calls periodically to provide status information about active
monitoring test cases. The plug-in uses a generic interface for Nagios plug-ins.
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Figure 5.1: AAIEye Component Diagram
Other important components are probes, which are small applications designed to
run on the Service/Identity Provider host. They communicate with monitoring
server, sending status data about the Service/Identity Provider, which is described
later in this chapter.
5.2.1 Monitoring Server
The AAIEye monitoring server is centralised data collection point in the monitoring
system. It is responsible for running the active monitoring login tests, collecting the
test results and receiving and storing the data that is obtained from the probes. A
monitoring server may monitor the whole federation, a part of it or even multiple
federations depending on configuration. It is possible to run multiple monitoring
servers - for example, an organisation might run a monitoring server for its internal
federation, and the other federations it is part of might run their own monitoring
servers.
The monitoring server is implemented in Java, to allow support for multiple plat-
forms and to have benefit from Java’s extensive libraries for XML and unit testing.
Using Unit Testing For Monitoring
The distributed nature of the AAI makes it challenging to get reliable information
about the availability of the services. Typically, an Identity Provider installation will
depend on many other services - the Identity Provider application, a HTTP server,
a directory or a database server are the most common ones. A Service Provider has
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likewise dependencies.
One approach would be to monitor the availability of individual services, like the
response codes from HTTP server or from the database. Many organisations actually
do already this. From the experiences as the Haka federation operator it can be seen,
that this is not enough – the problems are often related to configuration mistakes
or changes, or the federation metadata update process – problems that currently
can not be easily detected. The providers of the federation are hosted by many
different organisations so monitoring them is more complex due to firewalls and
security policies. Knowing the exact point of failure is sometimes hard because of
these organisation borders – the diagnostics takes time and requires an experienced
administrator.
AAIEye
Monitoring Server
Identity Providers
Service Providers
WAYF
Nagios
WWW -
interface
SP/IdP Administartor
Figure 5.2: Monitoring Architecture
Because of these limitations, the AAI monitoring is designed to be done from the
end user point of view. A unit testing approach was chosen, using JUnit [5]- and
HtmlUnit -based JWebUnit [6] -framework. For monitoring the availability of a
Service Provider, a test case is to be created. The test case should describe the
required steps for an end user to log in to the Service. The success or failure is
detected by searching for a text string that should appear on the HTML page that
the end user sees after successful login.
The JWebUnit is a testing framework for web application development. It has a
high level application programming interface (API) to support easy testing for web
CHAPTER 5. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 39
site correctness. It is used by defining a test case, which describes the initial setup,
the test procedure and the expected result. This approach fits well for monitoring
the federated login – the user credentials and service URL are set on the initial
setup, the login phase is described as the test procedure and the expected result
is successful login on the target web site. The JWebUnit framework handles many
details of this invisibly for the monitoring application, for example, HTML parsing
and HTTP redirects. This means that using JWebUnit for monitoring is possible
without writing much new code.
Configuring the test cases is done with XML based configuration files, as seen on
Listing 5.3. This example shows a simple case of federated login. What needs to
be configured is the details for Identity Provider – the user name, password and the
Identity Provider to be used, the actual login flow and the expected result. In this
example, a Shibboleth Identity Provider ”aitta2.funet.fi” is used with test account
”username”. The Service Provider is using simpleSAMLphp software, and we expect
to find string ”Welcome username” in case of successful login.
<IdentityProvider id="aitta2IdP" name="aitta2.funet.fi">
<Attribute name="j_username" type="text" value="username"/>
<Attribute name="j_password" type="text" value="password"/>
</IdentityProvider>
<ServiceProvider id="maneesiSP"
name="SimpleSAMLPHP test server"
startURL="http://maneesi.funet.fi/saml2-example.php">
<Page submit="" />
<Page type="IdP" />
<Page submit="" />
</ServiceProvider>
<Test federation="Haka" name="maneesiSP/Aitta2IdP">
<ServiceProvider ref="maneesiSP" />
<IdentityProvider ref="aitta2IdP" />
<AssertResult type="text" value="Welcome username"/>
<Period>
<Minutes>15</Minutes>
</Period>
</Test>
Listing 5.3: Example of configuring active monitoring
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5.2.2 Probes
The probes are small applications that are constantly running on the AAI com-
ponents, the Identity Provider host or the Service Provider host. Three probes
are implemented; a usage statistics probe for both Shibboleth Service Provider and
Shibboleth Identity Provider, and the metadata checking probe, which can be run
on either Service Provider or Identity Provider.
The interface for the probes has to be designed with extensibility in mind. Adding
support for different AAI software will require writing a custom probe for them
that complies with the probe interface. For this reason, the interfaces is kept small
and simple as possible. The configuration of the probes will include support for
dynamic class loading, to support implementation of the probes more easily and
independently from other components.
Service Providers
Identity Providers
AAIEye 
Monitoring Server
SQL 
Database
Statistics Viewer
AAIEye 
Probe
AAIEye 
Probe
Figure 5.4: Probe Architecture
The Java code example in Listing 5.5 describes the Probe interface.
Usage statistics
During their normal operation the Service Providers keep a log about the most im-
portant events. In case of Shibboleth, this includes at least new sessions, when users
that have authenticated themselves connect to the resources. The Usage statistics
probe works by periodically scanning the log files of Service Provider, and it looks
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public interface Probe {
/** Sends the results of the Probe to the Monitor Server */
public void sendResults();
/** Runs the Probe. */
public String run();
/** Initialises the probe.
* @param p
* @param runner */
public void init(ProbeRunner runner, ProbeType p);
}
Listing 5.5: AAIEye Interface Probe
for the details of user logins. Shibboleth keeps track of the IP address, session id,
the Identity Provider that was used and the application that was accessed. The
probe then sends this usage data to the monitoring server.
For persistent storing of probe data, a data storage has to be implemented. A
relational SQL database is a common solution, and it is used for storing the log
events. A support for MySQL database is implemented, but it is relatively easy to
add support for other database engines as well.
Though it is the monitoring server’s responsibility to check the timestamps of the log
events, the usage statistics probe will also keep track of the latest successful event
transmission, to reduce unnecessary network traffic. The XML format is rather
verbose, and the much data will be transferred if there are lots of login attempts on
a provider.
The log files on Service Provider may contain personal information, as Shibboleth
logs the values of the attributes when logging level is high. To comply with data
protection principle, no personal information is transferred – all the processing will
be done on the Service Provider and the resulting data will not contain anything
sensitive. The following data is transferred:
• Entity ID of the Service Provider Probe.
• Identity Provider that performed the authentication.
• Time of the event.
• Event type; successful login or error.
An example of typical data sent by Service Provider Probe is shown in Listing 5.6.
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>
<AAIEyeProbeData>
<Sender entityId="https://aitta.funet.fi/" />
<IdP entityId="urn:mace:funet.fi:haka:csc.fi:idp">
<Application applicationId="default">
<Event type="login">
<Time>2007-01-17T14:42:31.000</Time>
</Event>
</Application>
</IdP>
<IdP entityId="aitta.funet.fi:8443">
<Application applicationId="default">
<Event type="login">
<Time>2007-01-16T05:15:34.000</Time>
</Event>
<Event type="login">
<Time>2007-01-16T05:21:34.000</Time>
</Event>
</IdP>
</AAIEyeProbeData>
Listing 5.6: AAIEye Probe Data Example
There is also a probe for parsing the Identity Provider logs. This probe does the
similar task than the Service Provider probe described using the Identity Provider’s
audit logs. Naturally, it would be unnecessary to deploy probes both on Identity
and Service Providers, choosing either is enough for complete statistics. But it was
expected that not every organisation is willing to participate by installing a probe,
so both versions are implemented.
Metadata checking
As specified in the requirements specification, a probe for analysing the freshness of
metadata files was to be developed. The probe is to be installed on the Provider to
be monitored, where it polls the metadata file the provider is using. Using Adler32
algorithm, the probe calculates a checksum of the file’s contents. The checksum is
then sent to the monitoring host.
The monitoring server receives the checksums from various probes. It has a reference
metadata file URL configured, which it polls regularly and compares the checksum to
those sent by the probes. From this information, the monitoring server determinates
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if the providers are using a current version of the metadata or not.
Metadata checking probe is so general functionality, that it is no way limited to any
particular AAI implementation. In fact, it could be used for completely different
purposes than AAI monitoring.
5.2.3 Communication between Probes and the Server
The probes will communicate with the server using XML over HTTPS. For this pur-
pose, a limited HTTP server functionality has to be implemented for the monitoring
server. It will listen to probe connections, do authentication and authorisation de-
cisions, data validation and pass the data to the storage component.
Authentication is based on server certificates. Since both Shibboleth Identity and
Service Providers will use server certificates, they are easy to use for other pur-
poses also. The monitoring server is configured with access control list, defining the
hostname and the entity IDs for the probes that are allowed to connect. A Java
keystore is used for storing certificates both on server and on probes. The keystore
must contain the certificates of the probes/server. For each incoming connection,
the certificate is checked. If it is valid, the server will check that the probe is using
a entity ID that is allowed for its hostname. This prevents accidental and misuse
cases, where usage data would be stored for wrong service.
Figure 5.7 describes the communication protocol between Probes and the monitor-
ing server. A Probe is configured to send its results periodically. It will open a
HTTPS connection to the monitoring server. In case of communication failure, it
will remember its state and will try to send the data again when next connection is
scheduled:
• A TLS connection is opened by the Probe. In this phase, the authorisation is
done using SSL certificates with client authentication.
• The server validates the probe data. If everything goes well and the data is
processed normally, it will return a HTTP 200 OK -response code. In other
cases, it will return a HTTP error code. If the server does not respond at all,
the connection will terminate on timeout.
• In case of error response, the probe will try to resend its results when the next
transmission is scheduled.
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• If the server can now successfully handle the data, it will now return a HTTP
200 OK response. In other cases, steps 3 and 4 are repeated.
Probe Server
1. Probe Data
2. HTTP Negative Response
3. Probe Data (retransmission)
4. HTTP 200 OK
Figure 5.7: Probe Data protocol
5.2.4 User Interfaces
A user interface for viewing monitoring results and use statistics is needed – there
are various use cases for both of them. Potential users for such information could
be:
• Service Provider administrators.
• Identity Provider administrators
• Federation operator
• End users of the federation’s services
• Management of the Providers
The requirements for the user interface is different between these user groups. The
user interfaces are designed to be modular, so that the different user groups can get
relevant information in an easy and secure way.
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Monitoring UI
For viewing the monitoring data two use cases can be found. First, the administra-
tors need to find out if their services are healthy and manage the way their systems
are monitored. Secondly, a simple UI is provided for the end users to quickly see if
there is some problems with the services they are trying to use.
To serve the system administrators, a Nagios plug-in for monitoring data is imple-
mented. The plug-in is designed to be run on the same host running the monitoring
server, and communicates with it using TCP socket. The Nagios then connects to
the plug-in using NRPE. The exchanged data between the plug-in and Nagios in-
cludes the status of the service, the execution time of the latest test case and the
time when the test case was last run. Using Nagios with AAIEye makes it possi-
ble to use advanced alert functionality, service break notifications and management
functions that Nagios offers.
Figure 5.8 gives an example of Nagios’s web interface when using AAIEye and Nagios
plug-in for AAIEye.
Figure 5.8: Nagios with AAIEye plug-in
For the end users and the administrators not using Nagios integration there is a sim-
ple PHP-based web user interface. This UI offers only the status information of the
single monitoring test cases. The information is retrieved from AAIEye Monitoring
server’s SQL database.
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Usage Statistics UI
The usage statistics collected by the monitoring server are visualised with a WWW
application showing the statistics graphically. The application will get its data from
the database of the monitoring server. The user interface has options for showing the
usage of Service Providers and Identity Providers which are sending their statistics.
This data can be shown in several ways – for example, monthly statistics of which
Identity Providers were used with a specific Service Provider, or login counts per
day, or error counts per day can be seen. This information can be used to predict
how much the services are used, and even to detect some problems. If the usage
of a busy service suddenly drops to zero this may indicate some problem with the
service.
Figure 5.9 shows how statistics look like. The services are identified by their SAML
entity ID, which in turn is mapped to more human-friendly name. The number of
failed logins is shown in this graph as red.
Figure 5.9: AAIEye Statistics
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5.3 Deployment
During the development process, the testing was done using two hosts which were
both running Shibboleth Service Provider and a Shibboleth Identity Provider soft-
ware. This test and development setup was quite limited for simulating the behavior
when used in whole federation.
Soon after some initial tests the probe was installed on one production level Service
Provider. This was needed to get more experience on the performance and reliability
of the code, since the usage of the test systems was very low. And to get even more
real-world experience, a testing phase was extended to include two production level
Identity Providers soon after this phase. Separate test accounts were created on
Identity Providers which were used in active monitoring. These Identity Providers
did not install Probes, but participated only in active monitoring.
The monitoring software and service were introduced to Haka federation system
administrators in annual meetings. At this point, the source code was also released to
general public for anyone interested to give it a try. During the Shibboleth training
sessions which were arranged by CSC, a brief introduction and encouragement for
deploying AAIEye was also given.
For installing the probe software a little Java and XML experience is beneficial.
The probe software is distributed as a source code format including an Ant build
script which does the actual compiling and also some preconfiguration. The probe
must then be configured to match the Service/Identity Provider where it is to be
used. This includes setting up the paths to the log files, the entity ID / name of the
Provider and the expected attributes.
Chapter 6
Results
6.1 Status of the Work
The requirements were turned into implementation and this work produced a work-
ing software which got the name AAIEye. The software is licensed under GPL and
available as source code at [15] for free. AAIEye monitoring has been offered as a
free service for Haka federation members and partners since 2007. The work was
also presented in Terena Networking Conference (TNC) in May 2008 and has gained
some interest from other federations too, most importantly within Kalmar Union,
as some of its Providers are monitored with CSC’s AAIEye service too.
CSC has promoted the monitoring solution for Haka system administrators. They
are encouraged to join the monitoring and statistics collection, but it is completely
voluntary. Table 6.1 gives a summary of how much AAIEye is currently used in
Haka. The numbers of Identity/Service Providers is from 22 January 2010. [16]
Active Monitoring Statistics Collection
Identity Providers 5 / 39 (13 %) 4 / 39 (10 %)
Service Providers 5 / 78 (6 %) 18 / 78 (23 %)
Table 6.1: AAIEye usage in Haka
As the table shows, most of the services have not adapted into using monitoring
or statistics collection yet. Some Identity/Service Providers provide their usage
statistics manually to CSC, by parsing the log files manually, but for some reason
have not installed AAIEye Probe for this.
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There are various reasons that delay the deployment process. Not all services are
considered that important that monitoring is needed – an end user complaining on
service failures might be enough for them. Many service administrators are also too
busy to install and maintain anything else than absolutely necessary. Other reasons
may include:
• It is not possible to create a test user account on IdP just for monitoring
purpose.
• The service is so rarely used that monitoring and statistics are not interesting.
• The administrator does not have enough knowledge or interest in installing
AAIEye Probe.
• The Probe implementation in Java is not suitable for the server environment.
• The availability data and/or usage statistics are considered as classified infor-
mation.
Getting complete usage statistics would be useful for marketing and developing the
federation, but for single IdP or SP administrator the benefits are not very clear.
Some kind of reward or requirement is probably needed to increase the number
of participants. For example, the federation contract could include a statement
requiring that members submit usage statistics in a way or another.
IdP and SP administrators and federation operator are the main users of the moni-
toring service. In this service, it is not so important to get all connections monitored
– the system administrators probably know which services should be monitored. The
federation operator can benefit from the monitoring service as it generates alerts if
the operator has made a mistake, the metadata is incorrect or the WAYF service is
unavailable. For this purpose having just a few test cases is enough.
Other options to increase the monitoring and statistics service usage have been
considered. The AAIEye software is introduced in the training sessions that CSC
organises for the Haka federation administrators. In those sessions it is possible to
get personal help on installing and configuring the software. When new services are
registered to Haka federation, the registration process asks also if the administrator
wants to take part of the monitoring.
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6.1.1 Functionality
The two primary functional requirement were ability to monitor the state of AAI
and gather usage statistics from Shibboleth Identity/Service Providers. In this work,
the software can fulfill these requirements. The monitoring does not produce much
false alarms either. An active monitoring setup is also highly independent on AAI
components used in a federation – a demonstration of this is monitoring Kalmar
Union connectivity with AAIEye which does not require code changes. In this
particular monitoring test, a Norwegian Service Provider using simpleSAMLphp
software is monitored from Finnish Identity Provider using Shibboleth software.
The architecture of Probes is extensible enough so it is straightforward to add sup-
port for gathering statistics from different AAI software too. The Probes include
instructions for doing this and since they are available as source code, administra-
tors can even do this by themselves. The support for Shibboleth Identity Provider
version 2.0 was added during the implementation process as a demonstration of this.
The requirement of partial use and easy separation of monitoring and statistics
functionality is met. At CSC there are currently two instances of monitoring server
running, one for active monitoring and the other for collecting statistics. Nagios
support is also in use and there is also an option to integrate AAIEye to customer’s
own Nagios installation. This option is currently used in one organisation.
Monitoring the metadata freshness is working, but has not seen much use. The
active monitoring test cases already check more reliably that the services are up
and running. The Shibboleth software starting from version 2.0 supports load-
ing the federation metadata dynamically using HTTP/HTTPS. Using this feature
is recommended and it has probably decreased the problems with using outdated
metadata.
6.1.2 Security and Privacy
An authentication and authorisation infrastructure is all about security, and by
monitoring it we wanted to improve it, not decrease. A monitoring solution must
offer high enough security, otherwise it is of little use. The security requirements
that were previously defined are however met in this work. By using an end-user
point of view, the monitoring application uses the infrastructure in a way it was
designed – no additional back doors were opened and no new features to the core
AAI software was implemented.
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The main security weakness in this solution is probably same as in federated identity
management in general – the username/password combination. For active monitor-
ing, the usernames and passwords must be stored in the monitoring service where
they are protected, but obviously storing those is always a risk. This risk is further
reduced by creating such monitoring accounts that have no access to other services
than those needed for monitoring purpose. Deploying other authentication mech-
anisms like X.509 certificate authentication on the Identity Providers can also be
used to reduce this risk.
The privacy requirements were high for this kind of tool, so it limited the detail of
information that this software processes. The Probes are designed in a way that no
personal information is ever sent outside. The statistics details stored in the central
server are not sensitive. Access to the availability information and to monitoring
statistics can be easily restricted to the level find necessary.
6.1.3 Performance
The active monitoring has generally proved itself a light-weight operation and has
not caused any notable performance problem. This depends on how often the mon-
itoring is performed – the Haka federation monitoring is done in 15-120 minute
interval at the moment. What comes into monitoring server performance this in-
terval could easily shortened significantly, but the load to the Identity Provider
and Service Provider must also be considered if doing this. Still, a busy Identity
Provider in Haka currently handles hundreds of authentication events per hour so
even intensive monitoring should not cause much harm for them.
Generating the XML data that the Probe sends to the server is memory intensive
operation. If the log files are big, this operation may use more memory than is
available for Java virtual machine by default. This problem can be handled by
increasing the memory settings. Other option is to alter the logging configuration
so that generated log files are smaller.
6.2 Future Work
The software developed is functional and usable in a way it was designed, however,
there has naturally appeared new use cases and improvement ideas as the software
has been used. Some of them have already been implemented, but there are still
many which are just ideas. This section discuss some of those areas of future work.
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Many www-sites are using functionality that depends on the user’s browser,
Javascript being one of the most common technology used. These kind of sites
turned out to be challenging to monitor by automated client – the Javascript sup-
port of the underlying library was not always complete enough. This made it im-
possible to monitor all of the services. Another major problem with the Javascript
support was that the library was leaking memory, which rapidly caused problems
as the tests were being run time after time.
The HTML code used in web is not always perfect, in fact, most of the sites have
pages that are broken or use non-standard HTML. This makes the life of the auto-
mated tests harder. Writing a monitoring configuration for this kind of web appli-
cations is also difficult. Generally improving and easing the configuration for active
monitoring would be useful, perhaps even some kind of tool or GUI for doing this
could be considered.
The statistics are currently transferred with perhaps too much detail. To reduce
network traffic and monitoring server load, more processing could be done in the
Probes to calculate some aggregated sums of login events and sending those instead
of details of every single event. This would naturally lose some information, but for
busy services this option would be useful.
It is worthwhile to follow closely what happens on the field of monitoring. The
Nagios integration has been very useful feature for AAIEye and there could be
other similar systems that would benefit from integration. For presenting the usage
statistics a common library and user interface could be developed or integrated, since
there are probably many similar statistics producing tools, the eduroam monitor as
one example.
There are now many federations and they are growing. The existing federations are
being connected together, and this creates more difficulties and failure points. These
confederations could benefit from monitoring solution, and a system described here
would adapt quite easily to different AAI software since it is dependent only on
external WWW user interface. More options for confederation monitoring would
useful to be able to fully separate confederation problems and helping to diagnose
them, and presenting the results in a proper way.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
The project of developing monitoring and reporting system has now reached its goals
as described in previous chapter. Main requirements were fulfilled and the software
has now been in real-life use for some time. Deploying the new service into wider
use has been a slow process, like it was expected at the start of the project. The
nature of the tool is challenging as many busy system administrators may see this
kind of tool purely optional, and more urgent projects are priorised over deploying
it.
The monitoring part of the system is not yet widely used in Haka. It monitors
some connections in Haka, but majority of Identity and Service Providers are not
monitored at the moment. However, on systems where there are constantly changes,
the monitoring application has proved its value. For example, CSC internal test
services have been monitored for a long time now and automated alerts when a
system administrator makes a mistake and services are down has been a real benefit.
The statistics are probably considered more important by the system administrators;
the statistics probe has seen more real-life action than the monitoring part of the
application. The operator of the Haka federation has been asking for usage statistics
to be parsed manually from the log files which involves manual work. Avoiding this
work has probably been motivation for the administrators to install our automated
solution. There has not been such driving force on the monitoring tool which may
explain the difference in their deployment numbers.
The support for different AAI systems and even confederations was considered im-
portant. The eduGAIN infrastructure is not in use in Finland at least yet. Thus,
the monitoring of eduGAIN has not been tested. Instead, as Kalmar Union went
53
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS 54
into production, the monitoring has been tested with some of its providers. This
example demonstrates how the monitoring tool can adapt easily enough to changes
in the underlying software.
Overall, the project has produced a working solution that quite accurately meets
its requirements. The limitations and problems of the solution were found out early
while gathering the requirements and designing the software. As the result, no
real surprises were seen. The software has been producing information to justify
the needs of AAI systems and this way it has helped operating and marketing the
Haka federation. Many new improvement ideas have been found, especially when
considering the confederation monitoring which is something new in this area. The
monitoring and statistics are perhaps even more valuable when system complexity
increases which means that further study and development in this area is likely to
be seen.
Appendix A
List of Illustrations
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2.3 Single Logout Problem.
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2.6 Shibboleth login sequence diagram.
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2.9 The eduroam infrastructure.
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3.1 A confederation.
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5.2 Active monitoring architecture.
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5.9 AAIEye statistics.
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